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Cybersecurity and Development
Introduction
While the rapid growth in Internet penetration has a potential to contribute
to economic and social development of the Global South (hereinafter:
GS), analysts are concerned about the dark side of this rapid digitization.
The spread of the Internet's penetration to more and more people in the
GS has the potential to fundamentally alter the global cybercrime and
cybersecurity landscapes. Referring to the emerging nature of the new
threats with the entry into the cyberworld of yet unconnected population in
the GS, Victoria Baines, Europol’s Strategic Advisor on Cybercrime noted:
“With two-thirds of the world yet to join the Internet, we can expect to see
new criminals, new victims and new kinds of threats” (icspa.org 2012).
Gady (2010) has put it most strongly in his argument that Africa’s “Cyber
[weapon of mass destruction] WMD” potentially poses a direct threat to
the world. This analogy is especially relevant for many GS countries such
as those in Africa, which have a large proportion of unprotected
computers. For instance, in 2010, 80% PCs used in Africa were infected
with viruses and malware (Gady 2010). Cybercriminals often use these
unprotected computers to launch cyberattacks against targets all over the
world. Unsurprisingly some GS countries are top cyber-crime sources.
According to Kaspersky Labs, in 2009 seven of the top 10 countries for
creating trojans designed to steal passwords were GS countries, which
accounted for 92% of such trojans globally (Kshetri 2010b).
Some of the key economic and social characteristics of the GS
include low level of human development index, high unemployment rate,
high degree of income inequality, low level of education, and weak
democratic institutions (UNDP 2006). These characteristics have
important implications and consequences for cybersecurity (Kshetri
2013a, c, 2016a). The objective of this paper is to provide insights into the
dark side of digitalization associated with the GS.
Rapidly escalating cybercrime is one of the most pressing global
challenges shared by both the Global North and GS (Nye 2011). In terms
of the roles in facilitating illicit transnational economic activities, Andreas
(2011) describes the Internet as “simply the latest—and not necessarily
the most important—chapter in an old story”. Many analysts, however,
have suggested that the Internet has potentially dramatic consequences in
terms of stimulating illicit cross-border activities that are unmatched by any
other previous technologies (See Kshetri 2013a for review).
There are a number of considerations that merit special attention in
cybercrime and cybersecurity issues associated with the GS. Since most
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of the global demand for digital technologies is likely to be from the GS in
the near future, cybercrimes in these countries deserve special attention
(Kshetri 2013a). Analysing the trend of cybercrimes across countries,
analysts have suggested 10–15% Internet penetration as the threshold
level for the generation of significant hacking activities (Reilly 2007).
Internet penetrations in many GS economies have reached this level.
From our perspective, the most important aspect of the global cybercrime
industry is that the highest incidences of cybercrime as well as growth
rates have been reported in some of the economies of the GS. For
instance, among the 12 countries that experienced the highest increases
in their share of cyberattacks during 2005–2009, 11 were from the GS:
Romania (1,501%), Colombia (749%), Indonesia (675%), Thailand
(570%), Bangladesh (416%), Iran (370%), Zimbabwe (361%), Saudi
Arabia (237%), Nigeria (214%), Vietnam (193%) and Kenya (161%) (Kim
et al. 2012).
The GS not only accounts for the origination of a significant
proportion of the most high-profile cybercrimes, but has also been a target
of some of the most sophisticated cyberattacks. A case in point is the
Stuxnet worm discussed above, which appeared in the second half (H2) of
2010 and crashed industrial control computers in a number of GS
economies. A highly visible and unambiguous target was the Iranian
nuclear programme. Nonetheless, the worm also disrupted the operations
of industrial control computers in plants in China, India and Indonesia
(Fildes 2010).
There are also reports that traditional organized crime groups in the
GS have been involved in cybercrime. For instance, Chinese gangs,
Colombian cartels and Russian and Malaysian organized crime groups
have reportedly employed hackers, diverted their efforts from traditional
activities to cybercrime and expanded their businesses globally (Kshetri
2010b).
Finally, due to cybersecurity related concerns, GS-based firms
have faced barriers to international trade and investment in a broad range
of countries. For instance, Australian, Indian, and the U.S. governments
have accused the Chinese company, Huawei Technologies of cyberespionage, which hindered the company’s internationalization (Kshetri
2016b).
The above observations suggest that cybersecurity-related issues
are rapidly emerging in the GS, which have important economic, social
and political implications. Nonetheless, in little research have scholars
directly considered factors associated with cybersecurity in the developing
world. In order to contribute to filling this gap, this research seeks to
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explain how structural and institutional forces influence cybersecurity in
the GS.
Before proceeding, some clarifying definitions are offered. For the
purpose of this article, the United Nations Development Program’s
(UNDP) Human Development Index (HDI) is used to classify economies
into the Global South and the Global North. More specifically, in the 2009
UNDP Human Development Report, the “South” is used to refer to
economies that had a HDI of less than 0.9 (Bakewell 2009). Institutions
are “macro-level rules of the game” (North 1990, p. 27), which include: a)
formal institutions such as rules, laws, constitutions; and b) informal
institutions such as social norms, conventions and self-imposed codes
(North 1996). A cybercrime is defined as a criminal activity in which
computers or computer networks are the principal means of committing an
offence or violating laws, rules or regulations (Kshetri 2009). The
International Telecommunications Union’s (ITU’s) definition of
cybersecurity is followed: “Cybersecurity is the collection of tools, policies,
security concepts, security safeguards, guidelines, risk management
approaches, actions, training, best practices, assurance and technologies
that can be used to protect the cyber environment and organization and
user’s assets. Organization and user’s assets include connected
computing devices, personnel, infrastructure, applications, services,
telecommunications systems, and the totality of transmitted and/or stored
information in the cyber environment. Cybersecurity strives to ensure the
attainment and maintenance of the security properties of the organization
and user’s assets against relevant security risks in the cyber environment”
(ITU, U.D.)
The paper is structured as follows. The article proceeds by first
examining the hollowness in the Global South’s digitization initiatives.
Next, institutions related to cybersecurity in the Global South are
analyzed. Then, institutional bottlenecks that affect cybersecurity in the
Global South are examined. It is followed by a section on discussion and
implications. The final section provides concluding comments.

Hollowness in the Global South’s digitization initiatives
The concept of “hollow diffusion” of Internet and e-commerce technologies
among firms in GS economies may help understand weak defense
mechanisms (Otis and Evans 2003, p. 49). The basic idea behind “hollow
diffusion” is simple: Many organizations digitizing their activities lack
organizational, technological and human resources, and other
fundamental ingredients needed to secure their system, which is the key
for the long-term success of online businesses. To take an example is the
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Central Bank of Nigeria’s (CBN) cashless policy planned in January 2012.
Stakeholders expressed concerns related to broadband infrastructure,
tested and accredited application software, trust economy, legislation,
human skill capacities, call centre backbone, consumers’ profile data, data
protection as well as credible regulations security (allafrica.com 2011). In
short, the failure on the cybersecurity front hinders their ability to utilize the
Internet productively. According to the online review site, Ecommerce
Platforms, showing that the website is “secure and trustworthy” is the key
to creating a successful online business (Zorzini 2016).
“Hollow diffusion” can take place in human (lack of skill and
experience) and technological terms (failure to use security products). It is
argued that organizations that adopt Internet technologies without
considering the costs and efforts needed to maintain those systems
generate a negative externality (Kshetri 2010b, d, 2013). Note that the
presence of negative externalities means that the failure of firms to secure
their systems have high social costs. In order to illustrate this point one
can take an example of Overture South Korea’s “continental cut-off”
services, which according to a chosun.com article, disregard clicks
originated from Africa (Kshetri 2010a). In general, some ISPs in the
industrialized world block contents originated from problematic networks
based in Africa (Garfinkel 2002). In an attempt to fight click frauds,
advertisers and pay per click (PPC) search engines activate geo-targeting
and monitor traffic originated from unusual geographical locations that
associated with cybercrime activities. Note that many clicks are generated
by robots which use infected computers in Africa and other parts of the
world. To take another example, annual surveys by CyberSource
conducted among North American merchants and released in 2006 and
2008 indicated that Nigeria and Ghana were perceived as the world’s
riskiest countries for online transactions. A high proportion of online orders
originated from these countries were rejected by North American
merchants (Dogbevi 2009).
While the hollowness can involve many dimensions, and has
different implications for different entities, it can be understood, from our
perspective, in terms of the lack of defense mechanisms at various levels.
That is, hollowness is related to the lack of capacity to manage risks and
vulnerabilities. Three dimensional of hollowness can be identified that lead
to a low degree of cybersecurity orientation: technological, human and
organizational structure.
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Technological dimension of hollowness
In most GS economies there has been a lack of indigenous technology
and patents related to cybersecurity (Kshetri 2016a). A related point is that
while GS economies have generated some innovations, they have failed
to give sufficient attention to security problems. At the same time while
there has been a steep decline in the prices of most information and
communication technology (ICT) products, anti-virus products are
unaffordable for most consumers. For instance, 60% of Kenyan banks
were reported to have insecure systems in 2009 (Kinyanjui 2009).
Cybercriminals are taking advantage of the hollowness by targeting
unprotected devices and luring unsuspecting customers to fake sites.

Human dimension of hollowness
GS economies are facing a shortage of CS professionals. For instance,
consider the government of India (GoI). A large number of IT security
auditors are needed to evaluate the adequacy of controls in the
management of project and business processes and validate whether the
controls are effective (Hettigei 2005). An estimate suggested that in 2013,
India had only 60 auditors (Doval 2013). Regarding the requirement of
government agencies to conduct security auditing of IT infrastructures,
websites and applications, it is important to note that most Indian
government agencies’ websites are hosted by the National Informatics
Centre (NIC), which was established by the GoI to promote IT culture
among government organizations. It is argued that NIC-hosted websites
are vulnerable to cyberattacks due to a shortage of manpower, especially
IT security auditors. NIC outsources security audit works due to the lack of
manpower. Likewise, in 2011, India’s central bank, Reserve Bank of India
(RBI) introduced a set of recommendations, which include the formation of
separate information security groups within banks and maintenance of
adequate cybersecurity resources based on their size and scope of
operation. The country is finding it difficult to enforce the RBI guidelines
due to the lack of IT security auditors to validate banks’ cybersecurity
practices (Bradbury 2013).

Organizational structure-related dimension of hollowness
Organizational structure involves formally allocating various work roles
into distinct tasks as well as associated administrative mechanisms in
order to control, govern coordinate and integrate work activities (Child
1972; Mintzberg 1993). Such activities may also cross formal
organizational boundaries. On the cybersecurity, one key global trend in
organizational structure involves the tendency to create the position of
Chief Information Security Officer (CISO). For instance, a 2014 PwC
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survey found that only 28% of over 500 companies surveyed had a CISO
or Chief Security Officer (Damouni 2014). CEOs and board often consult
CISOs to understand cyber risk, implement appropriate security controls
and promote a culture of defense. One study suggested that 90%
of CISOs are connected directly to their organizations’ top leadership
team, and half of them were on the leadership team (Sweeney 2016).
Most GS-based organizations have not yet adopted such a structure. For
instance, in India, except for few firms in banking, financial services and
insurance, telecom, and business process outsourcing (BPO) it is rare to
have a CISO in organizations (Pandya 2009).

Institutions affecting cybersecurity in the Global South
It can be argued that like any other economic phenomenon (Parto 2005),
cybersecurity has institutional components and implications. Building on
the work of Roland (2004), de Laiglesia (2006) classifies all institutions
according to the rate of change: “Slow-moving” institutions include legal
infrastructure, culture and social norms, while laws, rules and regulations,
contract enforcement, political process and governance are examples of
“fast moving” institutions. Such an understanding is important because
some of the institutional factors can be more easily changed than others.
For instance, laws and rules related to cybersecurity can be easily written
on the books in a short period of time. Nonetheless, the development of
legal infrastructures such as building a well-functioning cybersecurityrelated court system and employing judges and law enforcement
professionals well versed in cybersecurity takes a relatively longer time
(Kshetri 2016a). Mohammad Khairuddin Abdullah, Malaysia’s HeiTech
Padu Berhad’s director noted: “As long as they [cyber-criminals] are within
the country, the criminals can be brought to court, but you’ll be lucky if you
can find the judge, who can write the warrant and understands the issue.
Even though cyberlaws are in place, you need to have people who are
able to apply the laws, as most cybercrime cases will get cold in just 24
hours” (Ismail 2008). Likewise, eBay’s Albena Spasova, who worked in
promoting law reform in Moldova and Bulgaria noted: “Even in 2001, I was
meeting judges who thought cybercrime was someone stealing a
computer” (Wylie 2007). There has also been the lack of sufficient law
enforcement personnel to fight cybercrimes. For instance, following raids
on cyber cafés in major cities in Nigeria, cybercriminals were reported to
move to remote areas to carry out their operations (Daily Trust 2010). The
porous national borders and a lack of states’ controls on their territories
allow cybercriminals to migrate to jurisdictions with a weaker rule of law
(Mazzitelli 2007). There are some statistics to show porous national
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borders’ contribution to inter-jurisdictional arbitrage in West Africa. In
2008, 40% of arrested cybercrime suspects in Ghana were Nigerians,
38% were Ghanaians and the rest were from Liberia, Cote d’Ivoire and
Togo (Boateng et al. 2010). A Barrister of Nigeria’s EFCC noted that anticybercrime measures in the country forced cybercriminals to other
countries (tmcnet.com 2010).

Culture and social norms
It may be even more challenging to change culture and social norms that
may affect cybersecurity. For instance, most GS economies lack domestic
anti-virus companies. While top security software firms are based in
industrialized economies, businesses and consumers in GS economies,
mainly because of nationalism, prefer to buy domestically manufactured
software (Kshetri 2010c).
In order to further illustrate this point, consider firms in the Indian
offshoring industry. In an attempt to address their clients’ fear that
customer data will be stolen and even sold to criminals, Indian firms
engaged in outsourcing have taken measures to prevent attacks on
computers by current and former employees. For instance, call center
employees have to undergo security checks, which are considered to be
“undignified”. Firms have established biometric authentication controls for
workers and banned cell phones, pens, paper, and Internet/e-mail access
for employees. Computer terminals at Mphasis, an Indian outsourcing
firm, lack hard drives, e-mail, CD-ROM drives, or other ways to store,
copy, or forward data. The idea here is that while employees may be
willing to accept security checks that are considered to be undignified to
get high-paying jobs in the offshoring sector, average Indian organizations
may not consider implementing such checks that go against the
established societal norms.

Conflicting sets of rules of behavior
In some cases, institutional changes are characterized by conflicting sets
of rules of behavior, which may lead to the collapse of some of the
institutional arrangements (de Laiglesia 2006). For instance, in some
authoritarian regimes, cybersecurity measures mainly focus on cybercontrol activities. For instance, it was reported that the governments of
Mauritania hired botnet operators to attack their critics’ websites with
denial-of-service attacks (Cetron and Davies 2009). Likewise, Chinese
government agencies allegedly sent viruses to attack websites that were
banned (Guillén and Suárez 2005). Thus for authoritarian governments
such as those of China, the goals of strengthening national cybersecurity
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and maintain control over the society with cyber-control measures are in
conflict, and approaching one means to move away from the others.
The above point can be further illustrated by focusing on China’s
state strategies with regard to ICTs, which seek to balance economic
modernization and political control. Stated simply, this strategy broadly
corresponds to China’s unique approach and perspective to cybersecurity,
and is reflected in the various cyber-control measures.
It is fair to say that China’s extensive cyber-control measures are
supported by institutional arrangements in the country, which weaken
organizations’ and citizens’ cybersecurity initiatives. For instance, one
result of China’s weak civil society and strong state is that trade and
professional associations are likely to engage in activities that are likely to
promote the Chinese Communist Party’s (CCP) authoritarian agenda,
despite the conflict of such actions with the productive utilization of the
Internet. For instance, the Internet Society of China (ISC) announced that
it would help strengthen cyber-security orientation of users and Internet
companies. If the past actions of the ISC are any indicator, however, its
activities are more likely to be prompted by the CCP’s need to maintain
the dominance. For instance, in 2001, the ISC asked Internet companies
to sign a voluntary pledge, which required the signatories not to
disseminate information “that might threaten state security or social
stability” (Kshetri 2007). In 2009, China’s dominant search engine, Baidu,
and 19 other Internet companies received the “China Internet SelfDiscipline Award”. ISC Officials praised them for their roles in fostering,
and supporting “harmonious and healthy Internet development” (Kshetri
2013d).
While the Chinese government’s cyber-control measures have
been relatively successful, it has encountered a host of problems and
difficulties to achieve its goals. Unsurprisingly these measures have also
faced opposition and suffered setbacks as illustrated in the examples
below (Kshetri 2013b).
Consider the Green Dam Youth Escort firewall software program
launched in 2008. The Chinese government had announced a plan to
make it mandatory to have the Green Dam installed on all new PCs in the
country. The stated goal of the mandate was to protect children from
violent and pornographic contents. The first problem the Green Dam faced
was that while addressing one cybersecurity issue, it created side effects
that raised another. For instance, while it successfully blocked politically
sensitive contents, many viewed that the software would represent
significant risks to users as a single flaw in the Green Dam system would
expose the entire Chinese population to cybercriminals. For instance, a
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hacker able to attack the Green Dam system could have access to the
information of all users who had installed the system.
A second problem stemmed from the fact that it increased PC
manufacturers' costs, which led to an additional financial burden on
consumers. While the Green Dam would be free to users, manufacturers
needed to pay license fees to the Ministry of Industry and Information
Technology (MIIT) to install the software (Kshetri 2013b).
A third related problem had to do with strong opposition from
computer manufacturers and the public. They opposed because the
proposed measures lead to increased costs of PC. For example, Lenovo,
which is 57% government-owned, and Internet users, who are increasingly
acting on a bottom-up approach, participated in collective resistance
efforts to abort the Green Dam. Given the national security and economic
risks and a strong resistance, the Green Dam program was indefinitely
delayed after being installed in 20 million PCs. The unsustainable
business model led to the closure of BDLKPRC in the 2010 and the
company was near bankruptcy (Kshetri 2013b).
Another example is a 2011 regulation, which required
microbloggers to register using their real name. The regulation was
introduced so that law enforcement agencies would know the real user's
identity in anything objectionable to the Chinese Communist Party was
posted. The Nasdaq-listed Chinese online media company, Sina, warned
that such a requirement would negatively influence user activity and
threaten its popular microblogging service, Sina Weibo. Even after the
March 16, 2012 deadline, Sina Weibo continued to allow users, who had
not registered their real names to post and use its services (Kshetri
2013b).

Lessons from the above example
What lesson can be learned from the above examples? First, the
regulatory infrastructures have not kept pace with the rapid rise in
cybercrimes in the GS economies. Second, some of the social and cultural
norms are not conducive to cybersecurity. Third, in the case of some GS
economies (e.g., China), the diversion of resources to cyber-control has
led to only limited progress on the cybersecurity front.
There are, however, clear pressures that are likely to promote
changes in cybersecurity-friendly institutions. Prior research has
suggested that institutional changes can be seen as an outcome of the
dynamic interactions of contradictions. Seo and Creed (2002) have
proposed four sources of contradictions and “praxis”: “(1) legitimacy that
undermines functional inefficiency, (2) adaptation that undermines
adaptability, (3) intra-institutional conformity that creates inter-institutional
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incompatibilities, and (4) isomorphism that conflict with divergent
interests”. Regarding (1), if policy makers see clear economic benefits of
cybersecurity (functional/economic efficiency of cybersecurity), they are
likely to lead efforts to change relevant regulations. For instance, the
Chinese government gave up the requirement to install Green Dam due to
economic reasons. Note that China’s state strategies toward ICTs have
been to balance economic modernization and political control (Kalathil
2003). Likewise, in order to secure high‐paying jobs that the Indian
outsourcing sector offers (functional/economic efficiency of cybersecurity),
workers in the industry are willing to act against their social norms and
undergo security checks, which are perceived as undignified.

Institutional bottlenecks and cybersecurity in the Global
South
The impacts of “slow-moving” and “fast moving” institutions on
cybersecurity can be better explained with the concept of institutional
bottlenecks. The idea here is that various institutional factors in the GS are
likely to result in bottlenecks and congestions that impede the efforts to
fight cybercrimes.
Some elements of “fast-moving” institutions, such as corruption,
lack of accountability and weak law enforcement may create bottlenecks
for development. In this regard, Indian firms have generally expressed
dissatisfaction and frustration with irresponsible and unaccountable law
enforcement agencies. For instance, while most BPOs in Gurgaon had
been cybercrime victims about 70% of the respondents did not report to
the police (indiatimes.com 2011). Most organizations reported doubt about
competence, professionalism and integrity of the police in handling
cybercrime cases. About 50% of the respondents not reporting thought
that the cases were not dealt with professionally and 30% noted that they
had “no faith” in Gurgaon police (indiatimes.com 2011).

Institutional bottlenecks and technology-related issues
In a framework proposed by de Laiglesia (2006) for the analysis of
institutional bottlenecks in GS, technology-related issues and factors are
present at three levels of the framework: technological progress and
dissemination (institutional outcomes), technology opportunity set
(interaction and decision area), technology use, adoption and
development (intermediate outcomes). This section analyzes how these
elements may affect cybersecurity.
Concerning the technological progress and dissemination, some
GS economies’ wrong-headed focus on cyber-control as a component of
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cybersecurity has affected economic development negatively. For
instance, China's administrative monopoly, which has excessively focused
on serving narrow constituencies and has been largely unresponsive to
the needs of the majority of the population, has become one of the largest
institutional bottlenecks that has limited the country's capacity to utilize
ICTs for economic growth and development. In this way, China’s political
framing of cybersecurity issues has done a great disservice to
organizations in their pursuit of economic activities.
As noted earlier most GS economies lack domestic anti-virus
companies. One way to understand the low level of technological progress
is the lack of absorptive capacity, which means that many GS economies
exhibit a low level of national capabilities in the assimilation of
technologies and associated organizational practices (Cohen and
Levinthal 1990; Dahlmann and Nelson 1995). This can be attributed to
their institutional and social arrangements (Niosi 2008). To put things in
context, institutional, social and organizational arrangements in the GS are
not capable of coping with the rapid rise in cybercrimes. For instance, in
2004, of the 4,400 police officers in India’s Mumbai city, only five worked
in the cybercrime division (Duggal 2004). As of 2011, the Delhi police
cybercrime cell had only two inspectors (Anand 2011). In 2012, the Delhi
High Court criticized the lack of functionality of the Delhi Police website,
which according to the court was "completely useless ... obsolete and
does not serve any purpose" (Nolen 2012, p. A1). Likewise, Malaysia’s
HeiTech Padu Berhad’s director noted that out of the country’s 40,000
lawyers, only four were able to handle cybercrimes (Ismail 2008). In the
same vein, in the ITU Regional Cyber-security Forum for Eastern and
Southern Africa held in Zambia in 2008, an expert from the Democratic
Republic of Congo stated that factors such as the lack of legal experts in
ICT and poor understanding of ICTs and its added value in the national
economy was hindering the adoption of CS-related legislation in the
country (ITU 2008; Kshetri 2010b). Without sufficient measures to secure
their computers, GS-based organizations will not be in a position to realize
the full benefits of the ICTs.
Concerning the technology opportunity set, GS economies have a
tendency to use low cost, yet insecure technologies. While some argue
that networks in economies such as China have built-in security
mechanisms, as they have “wired security into their IT network
infrastructure” compared to the Western approach of “bolting it on
afterward to legacy systems” (Hawser 2011). Note that many systems in
the industrialized world were developed before cybersecurity was a
concern. However, contrary observations have been reported. For
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instance, China’s cyber-victimization can be partly attributed to the
country’s
crime-prone
technologies.
According
to
Microsoft’s
IE6Countdown website (http://www.ie6countdown.com/), as of January
2012, 6th version of Microsoft’s Internet Explorer (IE6) accounted for
27.9% of browsers in China. This compares with IE6’s shares 1% in the
U.S., and below 0.5% in Scandinavian countries. IE6 is reported to be an
inherently insecure and hacker-friendly browser. In 2006, for instance,
Internet Explorer was reported to be unsafe for 284 days.
GS economies also tend to use low cost and insecure technologies.
Some GS-based manufacturers also reportedly use cybercrime-prone
products in order to reduce the cost of PCs and other devices. The
documents of a cyber-fraud lawsuit filed by Microsoft against a Chineseowned domain provide a glimpse into this phenomenon. Microsoft's digital
crimes unit investigating counterfeit software and malware in China had
bought 20 new computers from Chinese retailers. The unit found
counterfeit versions of Windows installed on all the machines and malware
pre-installed on four of them (Kirk 2012). It was reported that when a
brand new and direct from the factory condition laptops bought in
Shenzhen was booted up for the first time, the Nitol virus was hidden in
the laptop’s hard drive. The virus started searching for another computer
on the Internet. The laptop was made by a Guangzhou, China-based
computer manufacturer, Hedy (Kirk 2012).
Finally, concerning the technology use, adoption and development,
many Internet users in the GS are inexperienced and not technically
savvy. A high proportion of them are getting computers and connecting to
the Internet for the first time. A majority of them also lack English
language. This later point is crucial due to the fact that most of the
information, instructions, and other contents for security products are
available in English language only. Many Internet users in the GS are thus
unable to use IT security products developed in English language.

Discussion and implications
While adoption of technologies and organizational forms developed
elsewhere allows poor countries to catch up with opportunities in rich
countries, the majority of GS economies have failed to seize these
opportunities (Wade 2008, quoting The Economist). This observation is
equally evident in the case of cybersecurity. Cybersecurity issues have
also brought about a radical challenge to the traditional way of measuring
technology adoption and usage by using indicators such as the
penetration levels or utilization levels (Easterly and Levine 1997; Veiseh
2010).
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The above discussion suggests that technological, human,
behavioral and policy-related factors have contributed to the hollowness of
the GS economies on the ICT front. Organizations’ and consumers’ low
levels of spending on IT security, in combination with low degree of
cybersecurity consciousness, suggest some of the sources of the
hollowness of the GS cyberspace (Kshetri 2010b, d, 2013). Cybersecurity
orientations of businesses, consumers and the government agencies are
determined by a set of factors different from those that are important for
the digitalization of economic activities. While the GS is closing its
economic gap in relation to the factors contributing to digitization, notable
lags are inherent in factors related to cybersecurity.
The above discussion also indicates that cybercrimes originated in
the GS have interesting international dimensions. Overture South Korea’s
“continental cut-off” service and similar other examples indicate that there
are already some signs that online transactions and activities originated in
Africa and other GS economies are disregarded or dismissed by economic
actors located in industrialized world. To take another example, Bordelinx,
a U.S. based international electronic facilitator, stopped its services to
clients from Kenya due to cybercrime concerns.
Cybercrime growth in Africa and other GS economies may increase
the risk of exclusion of the continent’s businesses and consumers from the
cyberspace. A Telegraph article has summarized best as to how 419
scams have harbored distrust of Nigerians: “Trust in Nigerian
businessmen and princes” is among the “50 things that are being killed by
the internet”.
An assertion of the dual economy approach is that GS economies
are characterized by an uneven development within a sector as well as
between various sectors of an economy (Chenery 1975). This uneven and
unequal development translates into differential cybersecurity
performance and capability. This can be illustrated best by comparing
India’s outsourcing sector with other economic sectors. Studies conducted
by Forrester Research and by the U.K.’s Banking Code Standards Board
indicated that cybersecurity standards in Indian call centers were among
the best in the world. As noted above, some firms in India’s banking,
financial services and insurance, telecom, BPO sectors already have
CISO in organizations (Pandya 2009). This means that new roles of CISO
in organization are defined and rationalized by corporate boards of
directors, CS professionals, legislatures, and regulatory agencies. Rowan
(1982) refers to this stage as institution building. This stage is often
followed by a period of diffusion, in which a large number of organizations
may adopt the newly institutionalized organizational roles (Rowan 1982).
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This is likely to happen if the new roles gain legitimacy and are perceived
as useful additions to the existing organizational structure.
Most economic sectors in India and other GS economies, however,
have suffered from a poor level of cybersecurity. In this regard, prior
research suggests that political, moral or technical crises and competition
from alternative structures in other institutional sectors can destabilize the
institutional and economic foundation of an existing organizational
structure (Rowan 1982). This means that pressure for change in the
existing cybersecurity practices is likely to build in the broader economy of
the GS. At the same time regulators and policymakers need to be aware
of the increasing importance of cybersecurity with increasing digitization
and focus on regulation, education and other measures to strengthen
cybersecurity and stimulate the institutional change process.

Concluding comments
The above examples are illustrative of how even genuine transactions
originated from the GS are rejected by businesses in the industrialized
world. This is a result of a hollow digitization of the GS. In this regard, the
discussion in this paper suggests that appropriate public policy in the
development of the digital society and economy must include steps to
strengthen individuals’ and organizations’ attention and orientation to
cybersecurity and enhance absorptive capacity in cybersecurity. A multifaceted and multi-pronged approach to address the dark side of GS
economies’ digitization is needed. For instance, governments and
regulators can increase social trust by punishing people who are engaged
in scams. Technological measures include elimination of insecure
technologies such as counterfeit software and increasing the use of
cybersecurity applications such as antivirus software. It is also important
to promote cybersecurity within organizations with better education and
training. GS-based organizations need to embed cybersecurity-oriented
culture throughout the workforce.
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